CMEA and COCOM Abolished: Restructuring Precision Engineering Industry in Hungary by Havas, Attila
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
CMEA and COCOM Abolished:
Restructuring Precision Engineering
Industry in Hungary
Attila Havas
1993
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52745/
MPRA Paper No. 52745, posted 8. January 2014 07:02 UTC
 
 
 
CMEA and COCOM Abolished: 
 
Restructuring Precision Engineering Industry in Hungary 
 
 
Attila Havas 
 
 
IKU, Innovation Research Centre 
Budapest University of Economics 
 
Budapest, Múzeum utca 17. 
H-1088 HUNGARY 
 
fax: 36-1-118 30 40 
 
 
a revised version appeared as “Re-structuring Precision Engineering Industry in Hungary” in: 
A. Lorentzen, M. Rostgård (eds): The Aftermath of ‘Real Existing Socialism’ in Eastern 
Europe, Volume 2: People and Technology in the Process of Transition, pp. 210-236, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Hungarian precision engineering industry, although fairly successful in the pre-war period 
and able to survive all the adverse corollaries of planning and CMEA orientation, might be 
wiped out by the long-awaited marketisation: far more competitive and powerful foreign 
competitors can now enter both its former single most important market, i.e. the former Soviet 
Union, and the domestic market. Thus accumulated knowledge of R&D and production 
engineers as well as the experience of the highly skilled blue-collar workers, albeit of primary 
importance in this industry, might become completely worthless and disappear. Combined 
with fresh capital, access to new markets, recent technologies and up-to-date management 
methods, however, it can (and should) be regarded as a major asset and the indispensable 
basis for successful restructuring. This paper suggests that sweeping changes in size, 
ownership, internal organisation, and product range are also inevitable so as to be able to 
adjust to the new environment. 
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 1 Introduction 
Precision engineering products are widely used: basically in all industrial sectors, as well as in 
public and private services, such as health care, education, energy and telecommunication 
networks, military, environment protection, etc. The economic and technical performance of 
precision (or instrument) engineering industry, therefore, has far-reaching implications: it 
influences the productivity and competitiveness of companies in other sectors, and hence it 
has bearings on prices and employment; and can significantly contribute to improve our well-
being through its impacts on health services, education, and other services, as well as via 
effects on our environment. 
These wide-ranging applications also suggest that there is strong demand for precision 
engineering products in a healthy economy. This has been the case in the advanced countries, 
indeed, in the 1980s. Various measuring, monitoring and controlling equipment are inevitable 
to reduce costs and improve product quality. Thus companies striving to enhance their 
productivity and competitiveness apply more, and more sophisticated, precision instruments. 
Ageing population, a major concern all over the world for national health care systems, boosts 
the demand for medical equipment. Environmental issues are also gaining importance, and 
hence there is an increasing pressure to install measuring and analysis instruments so as to 
investigate harmful effects on man, animals, plants, soil, air and food. Thus precision 
engineering has enjoyed increasing demand in the 1980s. Hence production and employment 
have shown a more or less steady growth in all the three major economic regions. (See Table 
1) 
Recent political and concomitant economic developments, however, have completely 
different impacts on the Hungarian precision engineering industry. It has been hit most 
severely by loss of markets, hence production and employment have been shrinking rather 
sharply, some 30-40% a year, since 1988-89. The industry might be wiped out by the long-
awaited marketisation of the Hungarian economy (and that of its former major customer, the 
ex-Soviet Union) though its track record would deserve a much brighter future. 
Hungarian precision engineering companies, relying on their own R&D results and 
licences, well-trained engineers and skilled labour, had produced a wide range of high quality 
instruments since the 1880s. Until the Second World War they had been interconnected to the 
world economy by exporting civilian and military products as well as having subsidiaries in 
European and South-American countries while both co-operating and competing with foreign 
firms in Hungary. Major European companies, e.g. Siemens, AEG, Zeiss, Brown-Boveri, 
Philips, Goerz, had either subsidiaries or joint ventures in Hungary. Technology transfer had 
been intense in both directions, due to ownership relations and licence agreements.
1
 
By the late 1940s precision engineering companies had been nationalised, like all others. 
Internal organisation and management methods had been changed in due course in order to 
comply with central planning and meet CMEA, primarily Soviet, demands. Contacts with 
former Western owners and trading partners had been severely curbed due to the fundamental 
political conflicts between East and West, notably in the 1950s. Due to the nationalisation and 
reorientation towards CMEA needs Hungarian precision engineering industry had lost its 
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former international competitiveness. Since the 1960s, however, quite a few companies were 
able to exploit opportunities stemming from the imperfect ‘insulation’ of the ‘capitalist and 
socialist world economies’: they had imported advanced Western technologies through licence 
and know-how agreements, and exported their products in bulk to the CMEA and developing 
countries at a premium price. COCOM restrictions, somewhat ironically, had even 
strengthened this special competitive advantage of the industry. These measures had 
effectively blocked the entry of major Western companies but not prevented R&D efforts to 
develop advanced products (or replicate them via reverse engineering). Hence companies 
producing military instruments and dual-use IT products used to enjoy a fairly comfortable, 
safe position, both in the domestic and CMEA markets. All in all the industry has remained 
reasonably successful - though in a rather different political and economic setting. 
As the long-lasting success story ended in 1988-89 some sort of restructuring, e.g. in the 
forms of reorganisation of large companies, incorporation of plants, emergence of small 
private companies, started before the systemic change and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
These latter moves, however, have required even more radical steps and substantially 
accelerated the wrenching changes. The fateful challenge this sector faces right now is 
whether it is possible to save, at least partially, the accumulated skills and knowledge by 
means of restructuring and privatisation. 
This paper, relying upon sector statistics and enterprise case studies, is aimed at providing 
some building blocks for a comprehensive answer to the above question by describing and 
analysing the ongoing restructuring process. Restructuring theoretically can occur in several 
ways: via the turnabout of existing firms, through the emergence of new ones, including the 
entry of foreign firms, and/or as a combination of these methods. Though new firms 
apparently abound in the sector, most of them have been established as a consequence of the 
reorganisation of existing large enterprises; in other words they are not genuine new entrants. 
Only a few foreign companies have entered the industry until the end of 1992 but none of 
them through green-field investment. The following discussion, therefore, focuses on the 
former rather than the latter way of restructuring. 
The remaining part is organised as follows. Section 2 highlights current changes as 
reflected by basic statistics (absolute and relative size of the sector, openness, financial 
indicators and market structure). Then Section 3 summarises the major findings of the case 
studies with regard to the external effects and influences, such as the loss of markets, 
competition, suppliers; and the internal changes, like management strategy, product range and 
quality, technology and investment, internal organisation, skills and training. Finally, 
conclusions and a tentative industrial taxonomy are presented in Section 4. 
 
 
2 Severe decline, radical reorganisation 
2.1 Absolute and relative size of precision engineering 
The notion of precision engineering refers to an industrial sector, defined by the Central 
Statistical Office, rather than particular activities throughout this paper. The major products of 
this sector include scientific, medical, industrial, electronics, and optical instruments and 
devices, both military and civilian ones. Since all products of large, diversified precision 
engineering companies are reported in the sector’s output, statistics cover quite a few other 
3 
types of goods as well. The sector accounted for 2.4% of net sales and 4.3% of exports (8.7% 
of exports conducted in roubles while only 1.7% of those conducted in hard currencies) of 
manufacturing industry in 1989.
2
 Some 2% of the capital stock (1.9% of gross value, 2.2% of 
net value) of manufacturing industry was deployed in precision engineering in the same year, 
and 2.4% of investment took place here. As Table 2 reveals, all these indices have diminished 
by 1991, i.e. the sector is shrinking. Taking into account that manufacturing industry has also 
declined in this period, it clearly reflects that precision engineering has suffered even harder 
times. Employment data suggest the same conclusion: the number of employees fell by almost 
30% in the sector while only by 13% in manufacturing as a whole from 1990 to 1991. 
Table 3 reinforces the observation that precision engineering has been hit hard: net sales 
(on constant 1989 prices) dropped by almost 30% in 1991 compared to the previous year. 
1992 data are only available for companies with at least 50 employees. These figures, 
reported in Table 4, indicate that this segment of the sector has declined even more 
dramatically: by some 50% in 1992, after a similar drop in output and revenues in 1991. A 
considerable part of this shocking fall is most likely due to the splitting up of former large 
companies. (See below in Section 3.4.) 
 
2.2 Exposed to the export markets 
Precision engineering companies exported a significant part of their output until the late 1980s 
(some 45-46% in 1988-89). The vast majority of exports, of course, was conducted in roubles 
(three quarters of total exports, or, in other terms, 34.3% of output in 1989, see Table 5). Due 
to this skewed structure of exports and the collapse of CMEA, export-sales ratio plummeted 
to a mere 26.8% by 1991. Imports almost tripled between 1988 and 1991 (doubled from 1989 
to 1991). 
Case studies indicate that exports continued to fall in 1992 while imports further climbed. 
 
2.3 Financial difficulties 
Loss of markets has entailed fatal financial difficulties for most firms, indeed. As costs can 
never be reduced proportionally with sales (see in more detail in Section 3.4.), significantly 
lower revenues cannot cover expenses. Thus most companies’ balance sheets were in the red 
both in 1990 and 1991. Hence gross and net profit margins aggregated at the sector level were 
negative numbers. (See Table 7) Most likely similar financial results can be expected for 1992 
as well. Banks, coping with a mass of doubtful loans, are unwilling to grant credits to 
companies in a declining industry, let alone if they are in a near-to-bankruptcy situation. In 
such an environment companies do not trust each other, hence require a rather obsolete 
method of payment, that is cash, instead of supplying in advance and waiting for uncertain 
bank transfer. One can also witness the renaissance of barter deals, as companies are eager to 
seize any opportunity to sell their products. A somewhat bizarre corollary of this development 
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compile consistent, unambiguous times series so as to provide a clear-cut comparison between the last `peaceful' 
years (1987-88) and the present `revolutionary' ones. 
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is that precision engineering companies’ managers now try to act as brokers, e.g. on the fuel 
market. 
 
2.4 Market structure: dissipating dominance of mammoths 
Contrary to the pre-nationalisation period - which can be characterised by a peculiar size 
distribution, that is, a host of small enterprises together with a few really large firms - 
monopoly-type situations had been prevailing in the sector, just as in the whole economy. 
Though during the so-called ‘reform waves’ the notion of competition had been praised, 
practical measures had not promoted it substantially.
3
 
Entry of private firms had been limited by a number of factors, e.g. lack of legal and 
economic opportunities to accumulate capital and invest it; unfavourable regulations and 
taxation for the private sector; also ‘tailored’ obstacles to purchase raw materials, especially 
imported ones, as well as to access to loans and other financial services; lack of appropriate 
legal forms. It should be noted, however, that some of these barriers were `lowered' already in 
1982. Since then quite a few small private and semi-private enterprises have been established. 
Some of them have been really successful and grown at least to medium-sized or even large. 
Entry of state-owned firms had also been a rare phenomenon for obvious reasons. Planners 
had favoured ‘coping with’ fewer and larger enterprises, rather than establishing small and 
medium-sized ones, as it would have made their life more complicated. 
The only consistent time series on current changes in the size distribution comprises solely 
1990 and 1991 data.
4
 In spite of this snag significant changes can be observed quite clearly. 
Table 8 reveals that the number of companies has considerably increased, in particular that of 
small firms,
5
 and more importantly, small and medium-sized companies account for an 
increasing share of employment and net sales. In other words, companies above 500 
employees are losing their weight. Firms with 101-300 and 301-500 staff exhibited a rise both 
in employment and sales, while their number remained the same. This implies that medium-
sized firms were best able to stabilise their positions during the turbulent transition period. 
It should be stressed, however, that these apparently new companies should not be 
regarded as genuine entrants for two reasons. First, most of them used to be operated in the 
sector as production units of large, multi-plant enterprises, with hardly any autonomy. Second, 
these ‘new’, ‘independent’ companies are still governed by their former headquarters, 
especially in those cases in which a majority stake was retained in these recently incorporated 
companies, frequently 85-95% of shares. (Their current and would-be impact on competition 
is discussed at a greater length in Section 3.2.) 
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 1988, 1990 and 1991 data on size distribution are only available for companies with more than 250 million 
forint turnover. As smaller companies accounted for 23.8% of the sector's sales in 1989, this time series is only 
relevant to reveal changes in a certain segment of the sector, but definitely not to characterise it as a whole. 1990 
and 1991 data are available on the aforementioned `smaller' companies, i.e. on those having less than 250 million 
forint turnover. The most important details of these two time series will also be analysed. 
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 E.g. from 189 to 262 in the case of firms with not more than 20 employees, and from 17 to 28 in the 51-100 
size category. 
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It is also worth highlighting some details of the two other time series: 
 as for companies with more than 250 million forints turnover, two size categories have 
shown a significant rise: companies with 51-100 employees and those with 100-300 
staff. Their shares have increased from 0.2% (1988) to 3.1% (1991) and from 3.8% to 
13.7% in terms of employment, in the two categories respectively, and from 0.03% to 
7.3% and from 7.2% to 23.7% as far as net sales are concerned. In the meantime the 
number of companies with more than 1000 employees has been halved and their share 
in net sales plunged from 70.5% to 36.4%. It clearly indicates that large companies 
have been split up to medium-sized ones, i.e. not genuinely new entrants have entered 
the sector. 
 in the case of firms with less than 250 million forints turnover, really small ones, i.e. 
those with not more than 20 employees, have expanded their share, e.g. from 28.8% to 
41.9% in terms of sales, as their number has increased by almost 50% in a year, i.e. by 
1991, from 182 to 254. This suggests that besides splitting up the large companies, 
new small firms have also been established. 
Concentration indicators also reveal that large companies are losing their weight. The 
share of the 5 largest companies (in terms of sales) in employment, net sales and exports was 
around 40-50% in 1988-89 but only 20-30% in 1991. (See Table 9) This is a long-awaited, 
favourable development, without doubt. However, figures clearly suggest that this is due 
rather to the severe market crisis of these mammoth companies than to the healthy 
mushrooming of small and medium-sized enterprises. In other words large companies are 
shrinking much faster than the sector:  
 In two-three years, their personnel has slumped by two thirds, hence their share in 
employment has plummeted by 50% (from 42% in 1988 to 21.3% in 1991). 
 As for net sales, their share has halved by 1990. Though it notably recovered in 1991, 
still remained below the 1988 share by one quarter. Their domestic market share has 
shown exactly the same pattern. 
 Their weight in exports has also considerably declined by 1991 (by 13.2 percentage 
points, or by 28.9%). 
 
2.5 Privatisation 
Privatisation data are not available at sector level. Case studies and other information suggest 
that quite a few state-owned enterprises, like in other sectors, have already incorporated into 
joint stock companies or kft (a legal form similar to the German GmbH), but the `new owners 
in the most cases are the former headquarters or other state-owned enterprises and banks. 
(Others also have to be incorporated by 30 June 1993 according to a government decree but 
some exceptions cannot be ruled out.) 
Data on foreign direct investment are not collected at sector level either. What is available 
from balance sheets, however, is the foreign stake in founding capital. (See Table 10) It 
should be stressed, however, that further investments after the foundation are not reflected by 
these data. It would be therefore misleading to use them to analyse the role and extent of 
foreign direct investment. 
 
6 
3 Adjustment at firm level 
This section juxtaposes the most important challenges of transition and enterprises’ 
capabilities and competences. First external effects and influences are discussed, such as loss 
of markets, competition, suppliers and infrastructure, in the latter case ‘intra-mural’ 
components, too, then the internal attributes of enterprises, i.e. management strategy, 
production range and quality, technology, investment, internal organisation, as well as skills 
and training. The underlying issue is adjustment: what sorts of strategic responses have been 
formulated, what measures have already been taken, and what factors hinder restructuring at 
firm level. The analysis is primarily based on enterprise case studies. 
 
3.1 Loss of markets 
The most striking characteristic of the transition is the loss of former markets. This 
development should not be surprising at all if one considers that transition itself has been 
made possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union - due to the long-lasting and severe 
economic crisis the political power required to maintain the Soviet type economic and 
political system was eventually lost.
6
 This, in turn, has led to the termination of the CMEA, 
the most important market of the Hungarian economy for decades, including, of course, 
precision engineering as well. 
The rather bitter general picture obtained from the sector statistics has been reinforced by 
enterprise case studies. A 50-60% fall in sales and employment is not a rare phenomenon, 
neither are bankruptcy and liquidation. Quite a few companies, even some long-established 
large enterprises, traditionally bailed out by government measures, have gone into bankruptcy 
and now are being either reorganised or liquidated. In other words, a virtually unknown 
phenomenon in the planned economies, that is exit, has also occurred.
7
 
These tough changes can be attributed to the skewed export orientation of the sector, that 
is, the heavy weight of the former CMEA. (See Table 11) 
Case studies have revealed that a significant share of domestic trade had meant indirect 
exports to the CMEA. In other words, major Hungarian buyers had been large enterprises 
exporting their products, for instance buses and other vehicles, to other Central and Eastern 
European countries. Therefore the former CMEA countries, in particular the ex-Soviet Union, 
used to be the main markets for most precision engineering companies. The majority of these 
enterprises can now export to the CIS countries only a small fraction of their former sales, if 
any. Demand for their products has vanished, e.g. in the case of military goods and electronics 
components (see in more detail later on); or their former buyers, for instance hospitals or 
declining engineering companies, are not in a position to pay in hard currencies or offer `hard 
goods’ for barter deals. (On the effects of import liberalisation and competition of Western 
firms in these countries see Section 3.2.) 
Some products, however, are still sold to the CIS countries in a considerable volume. 
These are crucial to control, maintain or extend large energy systems or communication 
networks, and their users, occupying strong positions in the CIS countries, for instance oil and 
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gas companies, are able to offer ‘hard’ goods for barter or can even open letters of credit. On 
the other hand, these buyers are in a (semi) lock-in situation since switching costs (including 
not only buying new equipment and scrapping the old, but learning effects and network 
externalities as well) would be prohibitive. 
In these cases there is a significant gain for the Hungarian exporters. In the late 1980s, 
when intra-CMEA trade was still conducted in roubles, 1 rouble was equal to some 26-27 
forints while 1 US dollar to around 70 forints. The exchange rate of the rouble, though, was 
around 0.9 US dollar. Thus prices of Hungarian goods, expressed in forint, automatically 
increased by 2-3 times when the US dollar replaced the rouble. It should be emphasised, 
nonetheless, that only a few Hungarian firms have benefited from this peculiar development. 
Other items, such as medical and measuring instruments or painting robots, might regain 
their market once these countries recover. Competition with advanced and newly 
industrialising countries’ companies, though, has become genuine since all trade is conducted 
in hard currencies and this might prevent Hungarian producers from recouping their former 
position. 
Military products, which used to account for a significant share of exports to the former 
Soviet Union, can hardly be marketed for a number of reasons: (a) as the former military 
barter agreement was ceased by the late 1980s due to the severe budget cuts in Hungary, the 
Soviet interest in procuring these goods had disappeared (before the Soviet Union was 
abolished), (b) the Cold War has ended, COCOM restrictions have eased, thus Western 
suppliers could enter, (c) overall military demand has also declined as scarce hard currency 
should be used to purchase badly needed food and investment goods. What is more, case 
studies have unveiled that arms conversion is extremely difficult or sometimes even hardly 
possible.
8
 
Electronics components have been wiped out literally overnight. Their suppliers lost 
immediately their former competitive advantages when prices had to be paid in hard currency 
instead of transferable roubles. Obviously it is more rational to buy much cheaper south-east 
Asian products in this new situation.  
A substantial fall can be observed in the domestic market as well. As mentioned above, a 
significant part of this drop is due to the collapse of the CMEA. Other important reasons for 
the loss of ground include import liberalisation, in particular in the case of consumer goods, 
promoted aggressively by Western suppliers, and cuts in defence procurement. A few 
exceptional cases indicate, however, that firms producing simple, widely used, general-
purpose industrial instruments basically for Hungarian buyers can enjoy relatively stable 
market opportunities. 
A radically new opportunity has recently evolved for the Hungarian precision engineering 
enterprises in the domestic market as major car manufacturers, Suzuki, GM and Ford, have 
established plants in the country. So far only a few of them have been accepted as suppliers of 
various parts and components, since the requirements of the above automotive companies, 
both in terms of quality and timing, are too rigorous for an average Hungarian firm belonging 
to any industrial sector. In addition, these (potential) customers, having long-established 
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relationships with their former suppliers, tend to rely on them.
9
 Nonetheless, they have to find 
some more Hungarian partners rather soon for two reasons. First, some of them have promised 
to ‘localise’ their production up to a certain degree in exchange for obtaining lower-risk 
investment terms by special agreement with the Hungarian government. Second, if ‘outsiders’ 
want to sell their cars in the EC, which is a must once the Hungarian market is saturated in 
few years, at least 60% of their value added has to be produced in the EC or its associate 
member countries. (Otherwise they would either be subjected to heavy tariffs or compelled to 
import parts and components from EC countries, which seems to be a more costly solution, 
given higher wages and transportation costs.) 
Developed industrialised countries have accounted for a fragment of sales. Hungarian 
products can only be sold in these markets if their suppliers have their eyes open to find niches 
where they can compete on quality with producers from developing countries, and on costs 
with indigenous ones, broadly defined. These products are either knowledge-based, but 
produced in small batches, e.g. specific measuring instruments in telecommunications, and 
hence product development costs do matter, or require highly skilled labour, like sophisticated 
optical components and instruments. In some other cases both development and production 
costs are of significance, e.g. in the instance of so-called ‘soft’ medical laser applications. It is, 
of course, much easier to maintain or even increase these exports, if Western partners, known 
through former trading relationships, set up joint ventures in Hungary. In general, privatisation 
with foreign investors is deemed in this sector, too, to be of crucial importance to provide 
access to new markets, especially in the developed countries. 
 
3.2 Competition 
The pre-war period can be characterised by rather fierce competition of a number of domestic 
and foreign suppliers. It also should be noted, however, that in spite of the rather intense 
competition and the presence of major Western firms, market forces had been significantly 
constrained by 
(a) cartel agreements of Hungarian and foreign suppliers, 
(b) government regulation of employment and production in exchange for subsidies, and 
(c) military procurement.
10
 
After nationalisation, however, entry barriers, in particular administrative ones, had been 
prohibitively high for decades in the Hungarian economy. Moreover, so-called parallel 
capacity of companies had been ceased by ministerial decrees, and the number of firms 
substantially reduced by centrally decided mergers and acquisitions. Hence competition had 
hardly been possible, simply for lack of competitors. 
The other source of competition could have been the supply of foreign manufacturers, but 
imports had been severely restricted for the previous decades. 
Hence most firms had enjoyed a monopoly situation in the domestic market. To a lesser 
extent this had been the case in the CMEA countries as well, due to specialisation 
agreements, though in these markets other suppliers, both Eastern and Western companies, 
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had also been present. In the world market, on the contrary, they had had to face fierce 
competition. Hard currency revenues, therefore, had been collected primarily in the 
developing countries (unlike in the successful pre-war period). 
Both market structure and import regulations have been altered by transition. Their 
impacts on competition, albeit pointing to the same direction, are of considerably different 
importance in the domestic market. 
Entry of indigenous manufacturers has not caused significant changes yet. Quite a few of 
them should not be regarded as new entrants, strictly defined, as they have operated in the 
sector for decades as plants of large companies. On top of that, most new legal entities are not 
really autonomous businesses. They are still owned and controlled, at least in strategic issues, 
by their former headquarters, hence mammoth enterprises have not been really split up. To 
boost competition, these ‘new’ companies have to become really independent actors, and learn 
how to do business, as the vast majority of them had only been responsible for manufacturing, 
and thus had no experience in R&D, finance, buying and selling, etc. Clearly, this learning 
process takes time. Once their market positions have been established they might have an 
impact on the behaviour of the other actors. Moreover, quite a few of them are still the only 
Hungarian producer of certain goods, e.g. lenses, crystals. 
From an efficiency point of view the most advantageous development is likely to be that a 
rather significant capacity - e.g. foundries and other general-purpose material processing 
equipment, installed so as to circumvent shortage of parts and components, and available 
exclusively for the former parent companies, hence dreadfully under-utilised in most cases - 
will (should) be used much more exhaustively so as to make profits. 
There are genuine new entrants as well, but their impact is even weaker as yet, since they 
are really small enterprises. 
Foreign companies have entered merely through privatisation, i.e. no green-field 
investment has been undertaken by them. Hence the number of suppliers has not increased 
this way. Nonetheless, their impact on competition has not been negligible, and, indeed, is 
likely to be really significant as they have introduced new products and technologies as well as 
new financial and marketing management techniques. These developments compel their 
Hungarian competitors to be innovative, broadly defined, if they are to survive. Foreign 
companies’ behaviour as buyers should also be taken into account since their requirements, 
e.g. reasonable prices, high quality and timely shipment, has considerable influence on the 
performance of their suppliers, including Hungarian precision engineering companies as well. 
Import liberalisation, on the contrary, has drastically rearranged the domestic market. 
Some products, e.g. electronics components, have been wiped out as imported ones are much 
cheaper. In other cases, for instance in the water meter market, a severe price war has started 
between Hungarian and foreign suppliers. Aggressive marketing methods, including not only 
forceful advertisement campaigns, but bribery as well, have also been mentioned quite 
frequently by the interviewees. While the former is so obvious that it does not require any 
proof, the latter one by its very nature can neither be verified nor disproved with scientific 
methods. It is a fact, however, that most Hungarian firms can finance neither costly 
promotions, simply for financial reasons, nor bribes, as the notion of ‘constitutional costs’ is 
unknown in the Hungarian accounting system. 
10 
Yet there are even more tough steps taken by foreign suppliers to increase their market 
share in Hungary. A simple one is to acquire a majority stake in a competitor company and, 
after a while, close it down. A rather more sophisticated one from legal point of view, but 
otherwise a quite straightforward action, is to offer a certain amount of money if the 
Hungarian competitor terminates the production of given goods. 
Competition has become genuine in the former CMEA countries as well since all trade is 
conducted in hard currencies. As buyers now have to pay with ‘real money’, as opposed to the 
‘transferable rouble’, they consider how to spend their money. Moreover, they now have a 
real choice, as major Western firms, eager to seize the market opportunities emerging from 
the opening up of these countries, are flooding in. In such a situation, price and quality do 
matter. As mentioned above, quite a few Hungarian products were not able to survive this 
unaccustomed, harsh selection. Some other factors are also at work to fortify this adverse 
development. While Western companies are in a position to offer favourable loans, usually 
guaranteed by their governments, Hungarian firms cannot afford to do so, as they badly need 
cash and the government has not elaborated any large-scale, effective scheme to back 
exporters.
11
 Bribery has been mentioned as an important ‘marketing tool’ in these markets as 
well. Again, it has not been possible to verify this information. 
To conclude, quite a few Hungarian companies are likely to lose partially or entirely their 
market shares in these countries, but others can make of use their fairly strong positions, such 
as long-established relationships with buyers and (semi-) lock-in positions of their customers. 
As the domestic market is likely to shrink in the coming years, and the former CMEA 
countries do not really offer bright perspectives either, restructuring should result in 
becoming competitive in the advanced countries. A relevant measure of the success, 
therefore, would be the sales in these markets, say, in 5 years. 
 
3.3 Suppliers 
Now it is usually easier to find reliable suppliers than few years ago, but there are still 
problems with the quality and timing of shipments, and prices are considerably higher. 
Moreover, domestic suppliers tend to require cash, whereas foreign ones either advance 
payment or letter of credit. Hence it is even more expensive to purchase parts and 
components. 
It is worth mentioning other adverse developments, too, as they are at odds with simplified 
text-book economics. One would expect that demonopolisation and unleashed market forces 
should result in competition among suppliers, hence in lower prices, higher quality and better 
customer service. In some cases, however, quite the opposite change has occurred. Special 
equipment, e.g. shaking (jolting) machinery, so-called clean workshops, used to be operated 
exclusively by large precision engineering enterprises. As their financial positions have been 
deteriorating and orders diminishing, they have shut down these workshops, leaving those 
who would still need these products without any supply. New firms have not entered yet since 
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these technologies are rather costly to install and require special skills to operate. Thus users 
now have to import these parts and components, i.e. usually to pay higher prices. 
The other unexpected phenomenon is that in spite of the seemingly intense competition 
some suppliers are unreliable. They want to make ‘easy’ money by charging high prices but 
do not really strive to keep their contracts. However, competition should oust these firms in 
the longer run. 
 
3.4 Infrastructure 
As for external infrastructure, the precision engineering industry has also had to suffer head-
aches, but none of them is of sector-specific. Major problems include a slow and costly 
banking service (a simple transfer usually takes 2-3 weeks); cumbersome customs procedures; 
an overloaded, obsolete telephone network (preventing the introduction of up-to-date 
information systems required for efficient decision-making); and tardy communication 
between Budapest and other regions. 
‘Intra-mural’ infrastructure also poses problems. First, obsolete heating systems and 
insufficient insulation put energy bills up. Second, shrinking companies require less space for 
production but buildings are not ‘elastic’; they do not contract with falling output, thus 
infrastructure costs do not diminish proportionally with sales, hence significantly lower 
revenues cannot cover expenses.
12
 Once buildings are substantially under-utilised, it might be 
better to clear and sell them so as to collect some money. Yet, it is rather costly to move 
machines to another building.
13
 Moreover, in certain areas, both in Budapest and elsewhere, 
there is an excess supply of empty industrial buildings. Superfluous machines cannot be sold 
easily either. 
 
3.5 Management strategy 
The most important strategic goals of firms, regardless of their ownership, include trying to 
retain at least partially their former markets, find new ones, introduce new products, and, as a 
result, move from the red into the black (or reduce losses in the shorter run). It is worth 
emphasising that some of them, while facing the challenges of loss of markets and 
diminishing sales, have started to enlarge their R&D budgets and intend to continue this 
course in the coming years. 
Special attention is paid to CIS countries as the former most important markets. The 
question to be answered here is whether these economies are likely to recover and provide 
market opportunities for their former Hungarian exporters. Most managers interviewed opt for 
‘yes’. If they are right, their ‘simple’ task is to analyse which products - whether present ones, 
slightly modified variations, or substantially re-designed and improved versions, or brand new 
goods - will be marketable on these would-be markets, then elaborate and implement a 
strategy based on this analysis. Nevertheless, there is no ground to exclude the other scenario, 
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namely a long-lasting series of deepening crises, hence chronically sluggish markets. Then 
firms have to decide whether to divest their machinery, partly or completely, or, on the 
contrary, invest in new machines and/or R&D so as to become competitive in other markets, 
either in the advanced or developing countries. 
In most cases, except private and privatised companies of course, privatisation itself, or 
more precisely preparation for privatisation, is the predominant aim of the current 
management. Briefly, privatisation is deemed inevitable for bringing capital (in particular cash 
injections to ease paralysing burdens of indebtedness), up-to-date technology and management 
techniques in, and getting access to new markets. Though it is clear for them that a ‘final’ 
strategy should be elaborated in line with the new owners’ plans, it does make sense to devise 
at least a draft. In doing so they can delineate the perspectives of these companies for the 
potential investors, and, not least, convince them about their managerial capabilities. 
 
3.6 Changes in product range and quality 
Most firms have already started to introduce new products; others intend to do so in the near 
future - otherwise they would not survive. The rate of this process depends on the available 
financial and technological sources (including intangible assets as well) and on the market 
opportunities. 
Privatised firms are in the most favourable position as they can rely upon the resources of 
their foreign owners. Some of them are going to replace all the former products in 3-5 years. 
Others have significantly improved the quality of existing products by introducing new 
technologies and retraining their staff in other factories of the parent companies. 
Non-privatised companies draw on their own R&D projects and/or purchased licences and 
know-how. High-tech companies usually have long-established tradition in R&D, thus the 
effective constraints on the introduction of new products have been economic rather than 
technological ones. In other words they possess the technical expertise required to improve 
former products or develop new ones, but not the financial resources necessary to complete 
their R&D projects, i.e. they are unable to scrap obsolete machines and install new ones, to 
promote their new products through massive and costly promotion campaigns, etc. As quite a 
few high-tech companies have been heavily involved in defence production it is a rather 
gloomy realisation that arms conversation seems to be hardly possible. 
 
3.7 Technology and investment 
To provide competitive products, firms need to possess both first class development 
capabilities and appropriate machines. These two aspects of technology are discussed in the 
following paragraphs, first R&D issues then production. 
As mentioned above, quite a few precision engineering companies have accumulated a 
fairly impressive body of technological knowledge and experience, in most cases comparable 
to those of their Western competitors.
14
 Thus it can be regarded as perhaps their most 
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important asset, and should be a significant part of their valuation, as they prepare for 
privatisation. A crucial problem is that these technological assets have not been used in an 
appropriate way, i.e. translated into economic success. One of the most important aim of 
restructuring should therefore be to alleviate this problem. 
Privatisation by foreign investors is likely to promote this turnabout, providing access to 
complementary knowledge and technologies, adequate finance and up-to-date managerial 
techniques to foster innovation. 
Preliminary experience, however, suggests that privatisation might cause adverse effects as 
well. The new owners want to centralise all aspects of technological development, from the 
very beginning of the process, e.g. attending conferences and trade fairs so as to collect most 
recent information, to the end of it, i.e. producing prototypes and the required documentation. 
The new task of the R&D units in the Hungarian plants is, therefore, primarily to introduce, 
and adapt, if necessary, the results of centralised R&D projects. Hungarian R&D personnel, 
though, have been accustomed to being involved in far more exciting and significant projects. 
What is more, engineers had been respected as the most important employees, since financial 
and sales issues used to be given less emphasis compared to technological ones. Now the 
whole situation has been completely altered, and might dissatisfy them: financial and sales 
people have become the most influential staff; moreover, decisions on technological issues, in 
particular on R&D projects, now are made by the parent company. To conclude, this sort of 
privatisation might cause ambiguous feelings for the R&D staff: they have more funds to 
perform particular tasks and considerably upgraded facilities on the one hand, but far less 
influence on R&D strategy and far less exciting projects, on the other. 
It is needless to stress, however, that without privatisation they might not have any funds, 
any tasks - not even boring ones -, any autonomy, as their company might have been 
liquidated. Or, in a less dramatic scenario, R&D units of former large enterprises might have 
been transformed into ‘usual’ manufacturing companies, producing principally medium-tech 
products, at best, and some high-tech ones. Nonetheless, it would probably be preferable for 
both parties to design such an arrangement where necessary centralisation on strategic issues 
can be maintained, while accumulated R&D capabilities are better exploited. Hence people 
would be more satisfied with their job, i.e. work harder and in a more efficient way, and some 
really innovative, promising ideas might arise, as ‘by-products’. 
The other aspect of technology, that is, production machinery, entails far less complicated 
issues from analytical point of view. Precision engineering companies have been vertically 
integrated in a fairly typical way which can be termed as ‘socialist’ vertical integration. Given 
the corollaries of central planning - that is, lack of competition, severe shortages of parts and 
components, hence dependence on unreliable suppliers, on the one hand, and centralisation 
and redistribution of, among other things, investment resources, on the other - literally all 
Hungarian managers had wanted to acquire any new machine whenever new machines were 
available and whenever their superior authorities allowed them to do so.
15
 No doubt this had 
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been rational behaviour in an irrational system: it had eased the headaches of shortage and 
dependence, and even created the illusion of having a ‘free lunch’. Of course, it should not be 
forgotten that these investments were financed out of the centralised pool of enterprise profits. 
In fact, it was a rather costly ‘policy’. First, investment projects had not been really 
harmonised in that period. In other words, the assets of most companies consisted of an 
apparently random selection of obsolete and up-to-date machines by the 1990s. Quite a few 
bottlenecks were created in that way, making production costly and inefficient. Second, efforts 
to become independent had led to autarchy, hence a wide range of technologies - from basic 
material processing technologies, e.g. foundries, die-casting, galvanisation and cutting 
machines, to sophisticated, complex optical, nuclear and precision engineering equipment - 
had been installed.
16
 As most of these machines could not be optimally utilised, it had proved 
to be a dreadfully costly ‘investment policy’. However, when these decisions were made, it 
was simply out of question. By the 1980s, though, at the latest, costs did matter. 
The other drawback of the former investment policy is that the above features of 
technology prevent privatisation of companies as a whole: potential investors, especially 
foreign ones, are not willing to buy companies with such heterogeneous set of technologies, 
for obvious reasons: they simply do not want to have, for instance, their own foundry, since 
(a) it cannot be economical, and (b) they are accustomed to relying upon specialised suppliers 
of raw materials, parts and components. Moreover, (c) they are not interested in buying 
obsolete technologies at all. Moreover, it is not sufficient to incorporate former plants: even 
they are too large and diversified, or, to put it more accurately, heterogeneous, both in terms of 
their technologies and their product lines.
17
 Vertical disintegration is, therefore, a sine qua 
non for restructuring. 
Privatisation has been of vital importance in the modernisation of production. Substantial 
‘cleaning-up’ has been done in these cases, i.e. quite a few technological phases have been 
contracted out so as to reduce production costs. New machines have been brought in (quite 
often not brand new ones, but superfluous equipment from other factories of the parent 
companies), and production layout rearranged in order to alleviate bottlenecks. 
Non-privatised firms are usually not in a position to replace their machinery, but they have 
also started to contract out general material processing tasks, and thus, to a limited extent, to 
modernise their technology, and reduce their costs. Yet, as already mentioned, it is getting 
harder to sell these excess materials processing machines. 
Surface-Mount Technology (SMT) is a good example to characterise the technological 
level of Hungarian precision engineering companies relative to their Western competitors. 
While major foreign competitors apply automated SMT, Hungarian companies do it without 
automation. Thus it can be regarded a medium level technology. Automation is inhibited by 
small batches: typically they only produce few dozens or hundreds of a given instrument. 
Mechanisation of soldering, however, would be economical even for small batches but in 
most companies this is prevented by lack of money. 
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[1992] and Havas [1992b]. 
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To conclude, product and process innovations are believed crucial in most cases. 
However, lack of adequate finance - to cover all costs of the whole process, including 
modernisation of production equipment and sales promotion, or even ‘creation of demand’ - 
hinders the conducting of significant projects, except in privatised firms. 
 
3.8 Internal organisation 
The internal organisation of both privatised and other firms has been substantially altered for 
several reasons. 
The most striking changes have occurred in large, multi-plant enterprises. Earlier they had 
wanted to grow through mergers and acquisitions, in order to become powerful enough in 
bargaining with authorities for resources, and thus banned any would-be reverse 
developments, i.e. efforts of their plants to become independent firms. The late 1980s, 
however, saw an opposite phenomenon, namely incorporation of plants. That way large 
enterprises could maintain their organisational integrity while getting badly needed fresh loans 
through their plants becoming new and independent firms from a legal point of view.
18
 
Besides loans, some equity was also raised. Now, on the other hand, they have recognised that 
organisational integrity cannot be maintained: privatisation, crucial for survival, is only 
possible for smaller, ‘streamlined’ units, not having to cope with the aforementioned 
problems of heterogeneous technology and product range. 
Incorporation has entailed considerable organisational changes both at the headquarters and 
plants. Headquarters have become drastically smaller and their responsibilities have also 
completely altered. Now, usually being the principal owners of the recently incorporated 
plants, they are supposed to operate as trustee companies and not to perform their former 
primary tasks, namely centralised, meticulous production management, purchasing and 
selling. The new-born companies, on the other hand, have to build up their own finance and 
trade departments, R&D units, etc., as most of them used to be mere production units. 
There have been some other organisational steps taken by most firms, regardless of their 
ownership and size, as they have to alleviate almost identical problems. As production has 
dropped, some workshops and plants have been shut down, and production management staff 
has been reduced. Meanwhile other tasks, such as co-ordination of suppliers, trade and finance 
(controlling), have been given considerably more emphasis, hence these departments have had 
to be supported with more staff, possessing adequate experience. In some cases it has been 
difficult to hire suitable persons, in particular for declining companies with hardly any 
perspectives. The number of staff employed in managerial posts has dramatically reduced, 
sometimes by 50-70%, for two reasons. First, fewer managers are required to control the 
shrinking staff of firms. Second, former rigid wage regulations had not allowed the provision 
of adequate remuneration for qualified staff without managerial titles. As these rules have 
been relaxed, it is not necessary to give such ‘ranks’ any more. 
Privatised firms go along the same line, since they have to face quite similar problems, as 
emphasised above. The only difference is that they can draw upon the managerial expertise of 
their parent companies. 
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3.9 Skills and training 
Foreign owners and managers of privatised firms and other Western business partners are 
satisfied with Hungarian blue-collar workers, technicians and engineers. They are well trained 
and experienced as the Hungarian education system has provided appropriate knowledge at all 
levels, from apprenticeship to secondary schools and technical universities.
19
 Some companies 
have operated their own schools to educate skilled labour, one of them since the 1910s. Indeed 
these schools have been highly respected in the sector. Engineers have regularly attended 
further training and post-graduate courses. It has also been a common practice to run special 
workshops for R&D and production engineers whenever a new technology has been evolved 
or is to be introduced. University teachers have often delivered lectures at these courses, while 
engineers and physicists working in the industry given seminars at technical universities. 
Though Hungary abolished mandatory plans and implanted some sort of simulated market 
into her economic system in 1968, and hence managers have had some ideas and practice 
about competition, marketing, finance, business strategy, etc. by the time when transition 
occurred, lack of these skills and expertise poses a more significant problem. Management 
schools - some of them with international faculty and curricula - providing a wide selection of 
courses on particular topics, have been mushrooming since the mid-1980s. Grants for trainees 
have also been available. Nonetheless, transition is not the ideal period for managers to leave 
their companies for a longer period either to attend a management course or to work abroad as 
a trainee since they have to face the challenges of the loss of markets, the threat of bankruptcy, 
privatisation negotiations, etc. 
Privatised enterprises are in a more favourable position as their staff can be retrained at 
their parent companies while foreign managers can be transferred to Hungary. They can also 
provide an international career opportunity to their Hungarian employees. 
Significant changes have occurred recently in managerial positions, again regardless of the 
ownership and size of firms in the sample. Quite a few managers have retired; some others 
have been dismissed as they were not able to cope with the problems of transition. Young, 
capable employees have been promoted, thus now they are highly motivated. 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
The Hungarian precision engineering industry, although having been fairly successful in the 
pre-war period and survived all the adverse corollaries of central planning and CMEA 
orientation, might be wiped out by the long-awaited marketisation of the domestic economy 
and that of its former major customer, the ex-Soviet Union: far more competitive and 
powerful foreign competitors can now enter these markets. Hence the accumulated knowledge 
of R&D and manufacturing engineers as well as the experience of the highly skilled blue-
collar workers - the élite of the industrial labour force -, albeit of primary importance in this 
industry, might become completely worthless and disappear unless new market opportunities 
can be found quickly. 
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It is worth stressing, however, that blaming the severe industrial decline and unemployment 
on the economic transition would be misleading. Transition and loss of markets have common 
roots; they are, in fact, ‘by-products’ of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse 
of its ‘wider empire’. Had the Soviet political and economic system been feasible in the age of 
the progressively costly armament race and the fierce globalised economic competition, 
neither transition nor industrial contraction in the former planned economies would have 
occurred. 
This research would suggest, however, that the Hungarian precision engineering industry 
must not be left to further decline, let alone to disappear, because a) it has a considerable 
impact on our well-being, and b) it also has significant assets. Measuring and controlling 
instruments play a vital role in enhancing quality and productivity, that is, competitiveness, of 
other industries; medical equipment contribute to ease and lengthen our life; while analysis 
apparatus and other devices are badly needed to tackle vital environmental problems. 
Precision engineering skills are also of significant importance in other major industries with 
far-reaching impacts on the economy as a whole; the most notable example is electronics. On 
the other hand, entry barriers are rather high in this industry, unlike, say, in textiles, due to the 
importance of specific skills. Thus it is unlikely that new private firms can start from scratch 
when the economic climate is favourable again, and precision engineering products are in high 
demand. 
Accumulated skills and experience of engineers and blue-collar workers, therefore, should 
be saved and exploited in an efficient way. Indeed, this body of knowledge can (and should) 
be regarded as a major asset and the indispensable basis for successful restructuring. 
Nonetheless knowledge alone is not sufficient for survival of the industry; it should be 
combined with fresh capital, access to new markets, recent technologies and up-to-date 
management techniques. As the Hungarian capital market is still fledgling, and access to new 
markets is as important as capital injection, privatisation by foreign investors seems to be the 
only viable solution in most cases. Hence the most important tasks of politicians and 
managers is to facilitate this type of privatisation. 
There are a number of obstacles to successful privatisation, though. This research also 
indicates that the industry, first due to the World War II and then because of the CMEA-
orientation and Cold War, has grown oversized. Hence basically all companies, and the sector 
as a whole, should be substantially restructured and ‘re-sized’ otherwise they would be unable 
to adjust to the new environment. The underlying task, therefore, is to find appropriate size 
and internal organisation which allow fast adjustment and attract potential investors. Most 
former multi-plant, diversified mammoth companies have indeed already embarked upon 
radical restructuring programmes. 
One of the most important steps has been taken - or yet to be taken in other cases - is 
vertical disintegration, and split up of large firms. This is, of course, not to claim that a 
‘healthy’ industry can exist without large companies and mutually beneficial division of 
labour between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large firms. The current large 
Hungarian firms, however, have been created by ‘administrative’ mergers and acquisitions, 
thus they do not show the advantageous attributes of ‘organic’ large companies (e.g. sufficient 
funds for successful R&D projects, international competitiveness, stable ‘hinterland’ for 
SMEs on the basis of the above features). The first step should, therefore, be to split up these 
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‘administrative’ conglomerates so as to pave the way for the ‘organic’ emergence of viable 
large companies, hopefully in the near future. 
One should not overlook, however, that privatisation might cause adverse effects as well. 
Hungarian R&D personnel have been accustomed to being involved in exciting, significant 
projects, as well as in the decision-making process. However, decisions on technological 
issues, in particular on R&D projects, are now made by the parent company. This might cause 
ambiguous feelings for the R&D staff: they have more funds and considerably upgraded 
facilities to perform their tasks on the one hand, but far less autonomy and influence on R&D 
strategy and far less exciting projects on the other. 
Privatisation by foreign investors is not the only way, of course, to introduce new products 
and technologies. Some non-privatised firms expand their R&D budgets in spite of declining 
sales so as to find new markets by developing and/or designing new products, e.g. based on 
their buyers’ specification. 
If restructuring is to be successful, it should result in genuine competition. Most plants of 
former large firms have already been incorporated, and hence the number of companies 
increased by some 30% from 1990 to 1991. Thus one could expect a fierce competition. 
However, this has not been the case. Most new legal entities are not really autonomous 
businesses. They are still owned and controlled, at least in strategic issues, by their former 
headquarters; hence mammoth enterprises have not been really split up. To boost competition, 
these ‘new’ companies have to become independent, and learn how to do business, as the vast 
majority of them had only been responsible for manufacturing, and thus had no experience in 
R&D, finance, buying and selling, etc. Moreover, quite a few of them are still the only 
Hungarian producer of certain goods, e.g. lenses, crystals. However, Hungarian precision 
engineering companies have to face rather fierce competition in both the domestic market, due 
to the liberalised imports, and in the former CMEA countries, given that trade is now 
conducted in hard currencies. 
Major characteristics and prospects of the sector can be summarised as follows. Quite a 
few firms, accounting for the majority of sales and employment, are only behind their major 
Western competitors a little in terms of technology, product characteristics and quality, but 
not at all as far as skills are concerned. Others, accounting for a smaller share of employment 
and sales are behind more, in most or all respects, while a few firms a lot, in particular their 
technology and product characteristics. The organisational structure and the managerial 
behaviour have already been changed in most cases, therefore further efforts to alter 
production, improve quality and strengthen marketing require new resources. As adjustment 
takes time, prospects are generally poor in the short run, but are better at least for some firms 
in the medium run. Intra-sectoral differences in terms of size, ownership, 
products/technologies and markets do matter in this respect. A tentative sector taxonomy, 
based on these major organisational aspects, has been developed to highlight these 
differences. These findings are reported in Table 12. (Finance and skills seem to be of less 
significance; the former is almost equally bad throughout the sector, while the latter does not 
pose problems.) 
As already mentioned, precision engineering has grown oversized in Hungary, output and 
employment, therefore, unlikely to reach again their mid-1980s’ peak. In other words, the 
sector as a whole inevitably continues to shrink in the near future and some companies should 
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exit. There might be crucial variance, however, between different scenarios. To illustrate these 
differences the two extreme cases are summarised here. 
In the worst case most companies fail to gain access to new markets (due to the lack capital 
injection and up-to-date management techniques required for adjustment), and to recoup their 
former markets (due to the ongoing crisis in the CIS countries and/or the entry of competitors 
from Western and newly industrialising countries). Small and medium-sized enterprises face 
severe difficulties as their domestic buyers are insolvent, and hence cannot have a solid 
production and financial background for their export activities. Thus only a substantially 
shrunken sector can survive. 
In the best case, on the other hand, no significant drop in sales and employment occurs in 
the short run, while in the medium run foreign investment in ‘streamlined’ large companies 
(or in their former plants) and in medium-sized firms continues at a considerable rate. This 
process contributes to the introduction of up-to-date management techniques and gaining 
access to new markets, in part via improved competitiveness. Exports are increasing to the 
recovered CIS and neighbouring countries (given that political conflicts are also resolved), 
and so is demand in the domestic market (due to good engineering market opportunities in 
general, and increased military and health procurement in particular). Small and medium-
sized firms, meanwhile, can survive and grow exploiting strong and solvent demand in the 
stable domestic market and niche opportunities in export markets. 
There is a number of opportunities for a competent government to act so as to reduce losses 
and facilitate a successful restructuring in this sector. To promote the above best case scenario 
it is of critical importance  
 to maintain vocational training (e.g. apprenticeship), used to be performed (at least partly) 
by companies. These firms might well be liquidated by now, or cannot afford to finance 
such a ‘luxury’ while fighting for survival. E.g. special schemes might be devised to cover 
a substantial part of the costs of vocational training undertaken by enterprises. As learning 
(competence building) takes time for obvious reasons (the very notion of accumulation 
clearly indicates this attribute of learning), skills cannot be acquired instantly, once they 
are destroyed but needed again. In other words, to let vocational training deteriorate (let 
alone disappear) would cause enormous losses in the medium and long run throughout the 
whole manufacturing industry, not only in the precision engineering sector. 
 to facilitate privatisation, to encourage both foreign and domestic investors with a variety 
of schemes and measures. Besides these so to say normative measures, however, there is 
another important task as well, due to industry specific factors. Multinationals tend to 
favour talks with government officials, rather than to start directly with company 
managers for a number of well known reasons. It is even more so in this sector because of 
the nature of products (military devices are always special, “sensitive” goods, moreover, 
together with the other principle products, such as medical and scientific instruments, also 
entail the delicate issue of large government procurement programmes). Therefore the 
government has a role to facilitate privatisation negotiations between companies and 
potential investors. 
 to split up large companies (if it has not been done yet, or not genuinely). It requires direct 
actions in some cases, at least the formal approval of the decisions prepared/made by 
managers of state-owned enterprises. What is more important, to make clear the 
20 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the State Property Agency, the State 
Asset Management Company, and the managers. 
 to boost the domestic demand with well-established procurement programmes to 
modernise the Hungarian army, the health care, educational and scientific infrastructure. 
 to facilitate some export activities, again due to some industry specific factors. As already 
mentioned, selling of military, medical and scientific instruments often entails the delicate 
issue of government procurement. It applies for the exports as well, of course, and also for 
other products, in particular telecommunication, automation and control technology 
equipment, where former buyers are in a sort of locked-in situation, hence there are 
relatively good chances to retain these markets. Western and NIC competitors, however, 
might also enter, moreover backed by the powerful weapon of huge, long-term favourable 
loans, guaranteed by their government. This is obviously a considerable threat. The 
Hungarian government should, therefore, provide both political and financial assistance. 
(Probably the most urgent and important task is to improve the political and economic 
relationships with all the former CMEA countries, especially with the neighbouring ones.) 
 
Table 12: Scenarios 
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Size Ownership Products 
and Markets 
Best Case Scenario 
(in the medium run) 
Worst Case Scenario 
Large, 
multi-plant 
State Advanced, primarily 
military, products 
Former CMEA 
countries, 
Hungarian army and 
health service 
Substantial reorganisation (incorporation of streamlined 
former plants so as to establish viable smaller firms, 
following a strategic business unit type approach) 
Privatisation of these new firms, primarily by foreign 
investors providing fresh capital, access to new markets, 
new products, complementary technologies and up-to-date 
management techniques 
Successful conversion of military technologies 
Recovery of CIS countries (i.e. re-opening some of the 
former markets) 
Massive government procurement to modernise the 
Hungarian army, health service, and R&D infrastructure  
Failure of reorganisation 
Lack of interest of potential investors 
Failure of military conversion 
Long-lasting economic and political crisis, hence 
further disintegration of CIS countries 
Further severe budget cuts in Hungary, thus hardly any 
government procurement 
Major Western military contractors seize all the 
opportunities both in the domestic market and in the 
CIS countries 
Large or 
medium-sized 
State Advanced control 
technology 
(components and 
systems) 
Locked-in buyers in 
the former CMEA 
countries (large 
energy and telecom 
companies) 
Complex restructuring as an efficient preparation for the 
inevitably coming fierce competition with major Western 
suppliers in the breathing space given the locked-in 
situation of their buyers, including the establishment of 
joint ventures or other forms of alliances, and then 
Exploitation of the considerable sales opportunities 
stemming from large infrastructure projects in the CIS 
countries to extend their current networks and, to a lesser 
extent, from the need to maintain them 
Failure in preparation for this competition 
Loss of these enormous, and most likely further 
growing, markets 
Large or 
medium-sized 
State Mid- (or in few cases 
high)-tech products 
Insolvent buyers in 
the former CMEA 
countries 
Complete and successful turnabout (privatisation, efficient 
internal organisation, appropriate size, new product-market 
mix, up-to-date management techniques) 
Recovery of the CMEA countries (especially that of the 
CIS), hence considerable investment programmes to 
modernise both their manufacturing industries and their 
health care system 
Failure of the restructuring process 
Long-lasting economic and political crisis, hence 
further disintegration of CIS countries 
 
Medium-sized State Mid-tech, general-
purpose industrial 
instruments 
Primarily Hungarian 
buyers 
Recovery of the Hungarian industry, stronger demand for 
investment goods 
Successful implementation of export-led growth strategy 
Long-lasting recession in Hungary, hence flat or 
declining demand for investment goods 
Entry of low-cost developing countries' firms: fierce 
price competition, decreasing market share 
 
 
Table 12 (continued) 
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Size Ownership Products 
and Markets 
Best Case Scenario 
(in the medium run) 
Worst Case Scenario 
Medium-sized State Low- or mid-tech 
products 
Domestic market, 
with fierce import 
competition 
Complete and successful turnabout (privatisation, 
introduction of an efficient internal organisation, new 
product-market mix, up-to-date management techniques) so 
as to gain competitive strength for survival 
 
Failure of restructuring 
Successful entry of further foreign competitors 
Loss of market 
Liquidation 
Medium-sized Privatised 
(foreign 
investors) 
Mid-tech essential 
consumer goods 
Export (hard 
currencies) and 
domestic markets 
Further technological improvement (both in terms of 
products and production processes) 
Safe position in the domestic market 
Increased exports 
Failure to improve production technologies and 
products 
Successful entry of foreign competitors 
Declining domestic market share 
Loss of export markets 
Medium-sized Privatised 
(foreign 
investors) 
Mid-tech, 
commodity type 
goods 
Export (hard 
currencies) and 
domestic markets 
Introduction of differentiated products and/or new 
production processes to gain cost advantages) 
Recovery of the Hungarian economy, strong demand 
Safe position in the domestic market 
Increased exports 
Failure to differentiate products and/or reduce costs 
Long-lasting recession in Hungary, weak demand 
Successful entry of foreign competitors 
Declining domestic market share 
Falling exports 
Small Private 
(individuals, 
ESOP) 
Mid- or high-tech 
products 
Domestic market 
Continuous managerial and technological improvement 
Favourable macro-economic environment (access to loans, 
special services, strong demand due to the recovery, etc.) 
Bold growth opportunities (recovered large and medium-
sized companies demanding parts and components, 
‘healthy’ niche markets, e.g. for special medical and 
scientific instruments)  
Failure to improve management practices, to introduce 
new products and processes 
Unfavourable macro-economic environment (lack of 
special loans and services, weak demand, insolvency 
of potential buyers) 
Stagnation or bankruptcy 
Small Private 
(individuals, 
ESOP) 
High-tech products 
Export markets (hard 
currencies) 
Continuous managerial and technological improvement 
Favourable macro-economic environment (access to loans, 
efficient bank and foreign trade services, etc.) 
Bold growth opportunities due to their cost advantages and 
technical excellence 
Failure to improve management practices, to introduce 
new products and processes 
Unfavourable macro-economic environment (lack of 
loans; inefficient bank and foreign trade services) 
Stagnation or bankruptcy 
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Table 1: Production of the EC, US and Japanese precision engineering industry, 1980-
1990 
(current price, million ECU) 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
EC 4670 4888 4884 5133 5707 6792 7144 7201 7606 8217 8744 
Index 68.8 72.0 71.9 75.6 84.0 100.0 105.2 106.0 112.0 121.0 128.7 
 
US 7047 9668 11824 13159 16174 17965 14147 12682 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Index 39.2 53.8 65.8 73.2 90.0 100.0 78.8 70.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Japan 2391 3486 3439 4514 5855 6596 7404 7339 8469 8815 n.a. 
Index 36.2 52.9 52.1 68.4 88.8 100.0 112.2 111.3 128.4 133.6 n.a. 
 
(constant price, million ECU) 
EC n.a. 6115 5634 5593 5925 6792 6992 6910 6995 7187 7406 
Index n.a. 90.0 83.0 82.3 87.2 100.0 102.9 101.7 103.0 105.8 109.0 
Source: Panorama of EC Industry, Statistical Supplement, 1992 
 
 
Table 2: Absolute and relative size of the Hungarian precision engineering industry 
(current price, million forints) 
  1989 1990 1991 1989 = 100 
Net sales  42579 46013 41688 97.9 
  % of manufacturing  2.42 2.39 2.31 95.5 
     1990 = 100 
Employment  n.a. 39433 27782 70.5 
  % of manufacturing  n.a. 3.44 2.79 81.1 
     1989 = 100 
Investment  1088 1147 489 44.9 
  % of manufacturing  2.44 1.81 0.71 28.9 
 
Capital stock, gross  16658194 18663658 16604961 99.7 
  % of manufacturing  1.88 2.01 1.43 76.1 
 
Capital stock, net  10563623 12348913 11622688 110.0 
  % of manufacturing  2.21 2.32 1.38 62.6 
Source: Author’s calculation based on balance sheet data 
 
 
Table 3: Real growth indices (constant 1989 prices, previous year = 100) 
       1990   1991 
Net sales       106.2   73.8 
  Domestic sales    120.3   92.0 
  Exports      89.6    n.a. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on balance sheet data and CSO price indices 
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Table 4: Declining larger companies* (constant price, previous year = 100) 
 1990 1991 1992 
Output 89.8 51.9 49.0 
Industrial activities’ revenues 100.1 52.1 53.2 
Domestic sales  91.8 59.8 65.2 
Exports 115.7 45.2 42.4 
Employment 87.0 76.9 69.2 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
* companies with at least 50 employees 
 
 
Table 5: Exports and imports, 1989-1991 (current price, million forints) 
  1989 1990 1991 1989 = 100 
Exports 
  Conducted in roubles  14592 12678 1046 7.3 
    % of manufacturing  8.72 11.75 13.40 153.7 
  Conducted in hard currencies  4967 5227 10122 203.8 
    % of manufacturing  1.71 1.53 2.46 143.9 
Total  19559 17906 11167 57.1 
  % of manufacturing  4.28 3.98 2.67 62.4 
 
Imports  32227 38378 62505 194.0 
  % of manufacturing  7.16 8.46 9.14 127.7 
Source: Author’s calculation based on balance sheet and KOPINT-DATORG data 
 
 
Table 6: Openness indicators, 1988-1991 
       1989  1990  1991 
Export-sales ratio (per cent)    45.9  38.9  26.8 
Import penetration (per cent)   58.3  57.7  67.2 
Source: Author’s calculation based on balance sheet and KOPINT-DATORG data 
Note: Import penetration = Imports/(Net sales-Exports+Imports) 
 
 
Table 7: Financial indicators 
  1989 1990 1991 
Receivable/Payable (%) 
  precision engineering 67.1 54.5 51.2 
  manufacturing 55.4 52.6 48.1 
Gross profits (million Ft) 
  precision engineering 2967 -727 -887 
  manufacturing 87862 40326 -23035 
Gross profit margin (%) 
  precision engineering 7.0 -1.6 -2.1 
  manufacturing 5.0 2.1 -1.3 
Net profits (million Ft) 
  precision engineering 1946 -540 -247 
  manufacturing 45429 30268 -5940 
Net profit margin (%) 
  precision engineering 4.6 -1.2 -0.6 
  manufacturing 2.6 1.6 -0.3 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on balance sheet data 
Table 8: Size distribution of the Hungarian precision engineering industry, 1990-91 (per 
cent) 
Size Number of firms Employment  Net sales 
(employees) 
 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 
     0 -   20 59.6 65.7 2.4 4.6 8.2 13.4 
   21 -   50 16.7 15.0 4.7 6.7 8.2 9.2 
   51 -  100 5.4 7.0 3.2 7.3 5.4 10.4 
  101 -  300 8.8 7.0 11.5 15.8 16.7 19.9 
  301 -  500 2.5 2.0 7.5 11.0 9.1 13.0 
  501 - 1000 3.5 1.5 20.8 13.9 18.3 8.9 
 1001 -  3.5 1.8 49.9 40.7 34.2 25.1 
All firms* 317 399 39433 27782 46012 41688 
Source: KOPINT-DATORG data bank 
* Net sales are reported in million Hungarian forints. 
 
 
Table 9: Major figures for the 5 largest companies and concentration indicators, 1988-
1991 (current price, million forints) 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 
Number of employees  16991 n.a. 9070 5930 
  % of precision engineering  42.0 n.a. 23.0 21.3 
Net sales  12951 12983 10680 12965 
  % of precision engineering  40.8 30.5 23.2 31.1 
Exports conducted in rouble  5529 6466 3901 17 
  % of precision engineering  50.1 44.3 30.8 1.6 
Exports conducted in hard c.  1535 1681 2060 3299 
  % of precision engineering  45.8 33.8 39.4 32.6 
Domestic market sharea (%)  14.4 8.8 7.1 10.4 
Source: Author’s calculation based on balance sheet data 
a Estimated as the 5 largest companies' domestic sales divided by total domestic sales (i.e. the sector's net sales 
minus exports plus imports) 
 
 
Table 10: Foreign stake in founding capital (million forints) 
  1989 1990 90/89 1991 91/90 
    (%)  (%) 
Founding capital  20978 26922 128.3 24237 90.0 
  % of manufacturing  3.4 3.9 112.6 2.7 70.1 
Foreign investment 
in founding capital  1228 2226 181.3 2187 98.2 
  % of manufacturing  8.3 4.9 58.4 1.8 36.8 
Foreign stake (%)  5.9 8.3 141.2 9.0 109.1 
Source: Author’s calculation based on balance sheet data 
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Table 11: Composition of net sales by markets, 1989-1990 (per cent) 
 1989 1990 
Domestic sales 54.1 60.9 
Exports conducted in roubles 34.3 27.6 
Exports conducted in hard currencies 11.6 11.5 
Source: Calculation based on balance sheets 
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